Proposed Arms Pact Launches Strategy Debate

The prospective agreement in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Soviet Union sounds like an arms controller’s dream come true.

As formulated in principle by former President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the treaty promises to cut almost in half the long-range nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. It could save the United States an estimated $2 billion a year in the short term and even more in the long term.

Yet the treaty, as it is expected to emerge in final form from the talks that were resumed last month in Geneva, already is the subject of intense criticism and debate.

Whatever the outcome of that debate, any strategic arms cuts on the scale envisioned in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) will require the United States to make vast changes in its national security planning and its nuclear arsenal--changes that represent a priceless opportunity to correct past mistakes or, critics warn, to make dangerous new ones.

“Clearly,” said Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, “our entire targeting doctrine needs to be rethought in light of the START reductions.”

Some arms control experts, including former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, complain that the treaty, as conceived, would contain terms that could actually make a nuclear war more likely rather than less likely. Kissinger and others argue that, depending on how the weapons reductions are carried out, the Soviets could have an incentive to launch a first strike.

Wiping Out the Peace Dividend

Also, the Pentagon is contending, much as it did when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was negotiated in 1972, that it will need a variety of sophisticated and more costly weapons as a result of a new treaty--more than wiping out any so-called peace dividend.

“START has clearly put us in a bind,” admitted a senior national security official in the Bush Administration. He said it has exposed contradictions in U.S. policies toward controlling the arms race, acquiring new nuclear weapons, choosing Soviet targets for U.S. nuclear weapons and deterring nuclear war.

These issues converge at a time when Cold War pressures appear to be subsiding, partly because of budget constraints at home and partly because of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s warming smiles abroad.

But experts across the political spectrum agree that ironing out the contradictions and unresolved disputes embedded in U.S. strategy becomes more rather than less urgent as the Cold War wanes.

That military buildups undertaken without coherent plans have often proved wasteful is a historical truism. Defense specialists warn, however, that a weapons “build-down” such as that now envisaged in START could be disastrous without a coherent strategy for obtaining weapons suited to the post-START world and without developing effective plans for using them against Soviet targets.

The START talks, which began under President Reagan, were delayed until June by Bush Administration officials so they could examine how the talks had progressed.

“We have had some reservations about whether, if we conclude the present agreement strictly in accordance with its present direction, we could get it ratified (by the Senate),” Secretary of State James A. Baker III said.

When the START talks resumed, the United States sought to speed up work on verification measures, even though it did not know what the agreement’s precise terms would be. And Bush emphasized that beyond weapons reduction, the goal of any agreement would be to “enhance security and strategic stability.”

He then reaffirmed the key principles negotiated so far, seeming to brush aside the concerns expressed by some members of his national security team.

As approved last year by Reagan and Gorbachev, the treaty would limit the United States and the Soviet Union to 1,600 delivery systems each--that is, intercontinental missiles and bombers. The United States now has about 2,000 missiles and bombers; the Soviet Union has about 2,500.

‘Accountable’ Nuclear Weapons

These delivery systems could carry no more than 6,000 “accountable” nuclear weapons--that is, weapons such as warheads that count against that ceiling and sub-ceilings under it. The result is that considerably more than 6,000 weapons will be permitted, in fact, on both sides.

Of these 6,000 weapons, no more than 4,900 could be ballistic missile warheads. These warheads, because they are fast-flying and accurate, are most capable of delivering a surprise attack aimed at knocking out the other side’s hardened, or fortified, missile silos.

Bombers, because they are slow and can be recalled after takeoff, will be discounted: If they carry only bombs and short-range attack missiles, rather than ground-hugging cruise missiles, they will count as only one weapon. Because the United States has about 200 B-52 and B-1 bombers, each of which can carry between 12 and 16 bombs and short-range nuclear missiles, between 2,400 and 3,200 of these nuclear weapons would not be subject to the treaty’s limits. The situation with the Soviets is similar.

The United States has about 13,000 long-range nuclear weapons and the Soviets have about 12,000. START would reduce these totals by 25% to 30% overall, to between 8,000 and 9,000 on each side, although it would reduce the number of the most dangerous weapons--the ballistic missile warheads--by 40% to 50%.

Despite the START treaty’s obvious appeal, some experts are critical of some of its provisions because they could have the effect of leaving the Soviets with relatively more nuclear warheads aimed at U.S. missile silos than they have now.

U.S. Silos Targeted

At present, the Soviets have about three warheads targeted on every U.S. silo. Under START, this ratio could go as high as 9 to 1, according to arms specialists Edward L. Warner III and David A. Ochmanek, authors of the new book “Next Moves.” This would be the outcome if the United States reduced its forces under START by eliminating mostly land-based missiles--a pattern it might follow to avoid cutting back its relatively impregnable submarine-based missiles.

Kissinger argues that in a crisis, having so many missiles available to use against U.S. silos could tempt the Soviets to launch a surprise attack in the hope of wiping out this country’s land-based missile force.

Warner and Ochmanek, among others, are less concerned about this possibility. U.S. missile silos are already vulnerable to Soviet attack, they reason, and even if the Soviets had more warheads to aim at U.S. missile silos, they would not waste more than three on each target.

Besides, the Soviets would realize that even if they could wipe out all U.S. intercontinental missiles, they would still have to contend with missiles carried by submarines and bombers.

Congress would probably reject a treaty that appeared to increase U.S. vulnerability, unless it was assured that START reductions will be structured, and new weapons will be purchased, to avoid this liability.

Soviet Targets

Of even greater concern to some experts is the impact of the treaty on the other side of the equation: the U.S. targeting of strategic locations in the Soviet Union.

Part of the U.S. nuclear force is aimed at Soviet nuclear weapons sites. START would eliminate more of these warheads--eight or 10 times more, by some calculations--than the Soviet missiles at which they are targeted.

This would leave a major shortfall of U.S. weapons to cover all the targets they now threaten. Thus one apparently inevitable consequence of the START treaty would be that some Soviet sites now targeted by U.S. missiles would have to be dropped. Or at the very least, the number of U.S. weapons now allocated to particular targets would be reduced.

For example, where current U.S. targeting plans might call for firing three warheads at each hardened Soviet missile silo to ensure its destruction, only two warheads might be allocated to each target after START takes effect.

But such reevaluations might turn out to be a plus, many specialists believe, by forcing the Air Force to end many wasteful targeting practices that it now follows.

Empty Tank Farms, Barracks

The Pentagon might decide, for instance, that it is no longer necessary to cover all Soviet missile silos for purposes of a retaliatory U.S. strike, because--if the United States were responding to a Soviet attack--most Soviet missiles would already have been launched. Similarly, if the Soviets were to launch a surprise attack, the tank farms and troop barracks now on U.S. targeting lists would be largely vacated in advance.

“It’s a plausible first response (to START) not to aim any longer at empty places,” said a highly experienced retired military officer who continues to consult on such issues. “That way we need not suffer a reduction in coverage and of damage expectancy.”

Some experts have long argued that the Pentagon should have made this decision decades ago, thereby reducing its demand for nuclear weapons and avoiding the present vastly overbuilt stockpile.

A separate controversy revolves around the number of missiles each side should be allowed to have. The treaty as now being negotiated would limit each side to 1,600 missiles and bombers, but Warner and Ochmanek argue that the United States would be better off with a somewhat higher limit--perhaps 1,800 or 2,000.

Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security adviser, appeared to favor a higher ceiling before he joined the White House team.

More Difficult for Surprise

The rationale for this view is that having more missiles for the Soviets to aim at would reduce the ratio of Soviet weapons to U.S. targets, making it more difficult for Moscow to succeed in any surprise attack. That in turn would reduce the Soviets’ temptation to start a war.

To these experts, it is far more important that the treaty limit warheads rather than the vehicles that carry them. Some go so far as to suggest that there should be no limit on missiles at all, that limits should apply only to warheads.

The Bush Administration has decided not to seek a higher ceiling, in part because it could be politically dangerous to appear to be moving in the wrong direction by seeking to keep more missiles rather than fewer.

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Strategic Air Command, the United States must compensate for the reduced arsenal it would have under a START treaty by modernizing its remaining strategic forces. In their view, all necessary Soviet targets could be covered adequately in the post-START world and the Soviets deterred from launching an attack if more accurate, powerful and flexible weapons are acquired.

The problem, in an era of budget deficits, is that the shopping list is long and very expensive. Here is what the Pentagon says it would need if the treaty becomes effective:

-- A new ICBM program, already the subject of considerable controversy. The Pentagon originally wanted 50 new MX missiles on rails, each armed with 10 nuclear warheads. Cost: $15 billion. Congressional Democrats as well as many experts, including Scowcroft, then a private citizen, favored building 500 single-warhead Midgetman missiles, to be mounted on special trucks. Cost: $27 billion or more.

A compromise has been worked out in which the existing 50 MXs now in silos will be put on rails in the early 1990s, at a cost of about $5.4 billion. Meanwhile, work is being accelerated on Midgetman, aiming for deployment in the late 1990s.

-- The B-2 stealth bomber. This is a particularly high Air Force priority. It would cost about $70 billion for 132 planes. The Pentagon delayed the program for a year because of budgetary and technical problems. Initial operation of the plane is now scheduled for 1992. But despite a dramatic test flight last week, funding for the B-2 still remains a subject of dispute in Congress.

-- Other modernization programs. These include more Trident missile submarines, at $2 billion each, an air-launched cruise missile using stealth technology, at $7 billion, and more secure command and control systems, at an undetermined cost.

“If the modernization program should be stopped,” the SAC commander, Gen. John T. Chain, warned in an interview at his headquarters at Omaha, Neb., “then I will go (to Congress) to testify against the START treaty, and so will the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

The fight over which missile to buy--the MX or the Midgetman--for the post-START arsenal dramatizes a basic disagreement within the national security community over what types of nuclear weapons and what capabilities will be most important.

The dispute ostensibly revolves around money. Midgetman is roughly twice as expensive for each warhead delivered. But the root disagreement is over which weapon would best deter a Soviet attack in a post-START world of drastically reduced arsenals.

One school, made up primarily of civilian arms experts and congressional Democrats, insists that the new missiles should be configured to survive any Soviet attack and still retaliate. A recent Brookings Institution study concluded that the survivability of weapons would grow in importance as the arsenals are reduced.

The other school, centered in the military and among conservative politicians, prefers weapons that can better fight wars and destroy the enemy’s weapons, even if they are less safe from a first strike. Gen. Larry D. Welch, the Air Force chief of staff, has said that “survivability has been overplayed. . . . The real issue is capability.”

This dispute reflects the tension between advocates of two strategies for fighting a nuclear war:

-- The retaliatory strategy of assuring the Soviets that the United States can ride out any Soviet attack and, in retaliation, destroy much of Soviet society.

-- The war-fighting strategy of being able to knock out Soviet weapons before they can be used on the United States.

Proponents of both strategies have long recognized the need for making intercontinental ballistic missiles mobile as the growing number and accuracy of Soviet missiles through the 1970s made U.S. silo-based ICBMs increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack. A Soviet attack in which two or three SS-18 warheads were targeted on each U.S. missile silo would destroy between 66% and 95% of the U.S. ICBM force, according to Pentagon estimates.

U.S. submarine-launched missiles and many bombers would be expected to escape and be able to retaliate. But the consensus of military and civilian experts is that the land-based missile leg of the U.S. triad of nuclear forces should not be permitted to become significantly weaker than the others.

The most credible solution to this problem, mobility, has already been embraced by the Soviets. They have deployed 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs on rails and single-warhead SS-25s on trucks.

Paradoxically, the U.S. proposal for a START treaty would ban mobile ICBMs, even though the Bush Administration wants to build both rail-mobile and road-mobile ICBMs. The Administration has promised to withdraw this prohibition element from the START negotiations once it gets assurance from Congress that lawmakers will fund its two-missile program.

In the end, the United States probably will not be able to afford both missiles indefinitely and will have to choose. The choice may come at the bargaining table in Geneva, where the superpowers probably will examine whether to ban multi-warhead mobile missiles, including the MX and the SS-24, as part of the START treaty.

Or it may be made unilaterally in Washington, if the Administration can resolve its internal ambivalence on which type of mobile missile to support. The White House emphasizes the survivability of new weapons, and this indicates that it favors the Midgetman; Defense Secretary Dick Cheney initially backed the MX.

The military’s insistence on weapons that are better at war-fighting than surviving is partly instinctive--”shooting first at whatever is shooting at you,” as one general said--and partly fear that political leaders will equivocate rather than act decisively in times of crisis.

For example, the Pentagon put 50 MX missiles, each with 10 warheads, into fixed silos last year, although they are just as vulnerable as the three-warhead Minuteman missiles that they replaced. Also, they are more attractive as targets because they carry more warheads and are more accurate.

One four-star general reportedly declared that he wanted the MX even if it had to be “put in the Pentagon parking lot,” i.e., above ground, where it would be extremely vulnerable.

But there is more to the Pentagon’s preference for power over survivability in nuclear weapons. The less survivable the weapons, the faster the United States must respond in a crisis. And a strategy of faster U.S. reaction means more certain and more punishing retaliation against the Soviets, while a policy of riding out a surprise attack before retaliating opens the way to all kinds of problems and potential failure.

Many U.S. weapons might never be launched, military leaders believe, because many command and control systems might not survive an initial attack. And decision-making by political leaders could be paralyzed. Still other problems could develop.

As a result, military leaders tend to favor acting before a full first strike has been absorbed and, in the meanwhile, to develop weapons capable of delivering the most devastating blows possible.

Critics, of course, note that such a strategy calls for weapons capable of hair-trigger reaction, which could bring war closer and increase the risks of catastrophic mistakes.

With so many complex issues to be resolved, experts say, the START treaty will leave in its wake years of debate and decision-making, far more than the arms limitation agreements of two decades ago.

And while the risks are certain to be emphasized, the opportunities should be at least as great.

START would make it possible for the Bush Administration to resolve wasteful and contradictory tension within existing policies: to create a smaller but equally deterring nuclear force structure, to plan more efficient use of the smaller number of nuclear weapons and to coordinate U.S. arms control policy with U.S. weapons acquisition policy.

No Administration since the dawn of the nuclear era has had a better chance to reform U.S. deterrent doctrine. Whether President Bush is able to do so may become a major factor in determining his place in history.